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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900246-CA 
v. : 
BRYANT COLLARD, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990), and possession of 
marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it, a third 
degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence seized from defendant's home pursuant 
to a search warrant? 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 
1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)). When a search warrant is challenged as 
having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, 
the reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, the reviewing 
court determines only whether the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). The reviewing court 
should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision. Ibid. 
See also State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert, denied, 139 Utah Adv Rep. 16 (Utah 1990). 
2. Was defendant properly convicted and sentenced for 
both possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it? 
Because this issue presents a question of law, this 
Court applies a "correction of error" standard of review. City 
of Monticello v. Christensen, 778 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990); 
Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional or statutory 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Bryant Collard, was charged with possession 
of a controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990), and possession of 
marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1990) (R. 8-9). 
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After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty as 
charged (R. 60-61). The trial court sentenced defendant to the 
Utah State Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five years but 
suspended those sentences and placed him on thirty-six months' 
probation (R. 61-62). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. The following 
summary of the facts is derived from the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant, the suppression hearing, and the hearing before 
the trial court in which defendant was convicted. 
On April 29, 1989, Officers Nielsen and Teuscher of the 
Provo City Police Department, acting on a tip from a confidential 
informant, intercepted and followed a truck driven by Rex Taylor 
(SH. 44, 48-49; Affid. paras. 2-15). They had reason to believe 
that Taylor was transporting and delivering large quantities of 
marijuana, in violation of the controlled substances laws (Affid. 
para. 3) . 
The officers followed Taylor to several locations 
around the Provo area and observed apparent drug transactions 
(Affid. paras. 5-15). At approximately 1:10 p.m. that afternoon, 
they observed Taylor take "a long a [sic] circuitous route" to 
130 East 350 North in Orem, defendant's residence (Affid. paras. 
References to "SH." are to the transcript of the suppression 
hearing. References to "H." are to the transcript of the hearing 
before the trial court in which defendant was convicted. "Affid. 
para." refers to paragraphs of the affidavit filed in support of 
the application for the search warrant under which the evidence 
was seized from defendant's home. Copies of the affidavit and 
the search warrant are attached to this brief as Appendix A and 
Appendix B, respectively. 
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15-17). At 1:30 p.m., at that address, the officers observed 
Taylor deliver "to an unknown white male in his 20's wearing a 
bright green shirt, a bag approximately the size of a grocery 
bag." The officers then observed the unidentified man enter "one 
of the houses" (Afficl. para. 18). Later that day, after Taylor's 
arrest and the impoundment of his truck, 12 to 13 pounds of 
marijuana and $25,000 in cash were discovered in the truck 
(Affid. para. 22). 
Officer Nielsen subsequently prepared and signed an 
affidavit setting out the foregoing facts which was submitted to 
a magistrate in support of an application for a search warrant to 
search defendant's residence (Def. Exh. 1) (Appendix A). Based 
upon that affidavit, the magistrate issued the requested warrant 
(Def. Exh. 2) (Appendix B). In a search of defendant's home, the 
police seized 843 grams of marijuana, none of which bore the 
appropriate state tax stamp (H. 3-4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that the magistrate 
had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause 
existed to support the issuance of a search warrant for 
defendant's residence. 
Alternatively, even if the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant was technically deficient, the trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion to suppress because the seized 
evidence was admissible under the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984). 
.4-
Defendant was erroneously convicted and sentenced for 
both possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) and 
possession of marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM 
HIS RESIDENCE PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT, 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence 
pursuant to a search warrant because that warrant was issued on 
the basis of an affidavit that did not establish probable cause 
2 
that his residence contained contraband. Specifically, he 
claims the affidavit failed to identify his residence as the 
place which contained the contraband the affiant officer 
suspected Rex Taylor delivered to the "unknown white male" at 130 
East 350 North, Orem, Utah. Defendant does not contend that the 
affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that Taylor 
was transporting and delivering contraband. 
A. Sufficiency of the Affidavit 
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court 
stated: 
Defendant's argument is based solely on the fourth amendment; 
he does not analyze the suppression issue under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the State will 
not address the question of whether the analysis would be 
different under the state constitution. See State v. Lafferty, 
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will 
not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an argument 
for different analyses under the state and federal constitutions 
are briefed."). 
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The affidavit gives detailed information 
about a man named Rex Taylor who was 
suspected of delivering marijuana for future 
distribution. An informant provided a tip 
about Taylor. This tip was verified by 
police observation. The affidavit describes 
a circuitous route with frequent stops and 
brief interactions with several individuals. 
At the end of this route the police arrested 
Taylor who had in his truck large quantities 
of marijuana and cash. All of these facts 
support a finding that Taylor was in the act 
of distributing marijuana. The defendant was 
one of the individuals who had a brief 
exchange with Taylor. The affidavit states 
Taylor arrived at 130 East 350 North, Orem, 
Utah[,] where Bryant Coliard resides. It 
then describes how Taylor "handed to an 
unknown white male in his 20's wearing a 
bright green shirt, a bag approximately the 
size of a plastic grocery bag. The unknown 
white male then turned and walked into one of 
the houses," The affidavit does not describe 
the defendant or his home in any more detail. 
[] However, the search warrant does 
describe the house in detail including the 
house number on the mailbox attached to the 
house. Whether the search warrant 
description is adequate depends upon the 
facts of each case, and the description is 
adequate if the officer with reasonable 
effort can identify the place. State v. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985). 
The search warrant description in this case 
should be sufficient for determining which 
house is to be searched. 
[] The discrepency [sic] between the 
supporting affidavit and the search warrant 
indicates that the house description probably 
was mistakenly omited [sic] from the 
affidavit. Omitted information must be 
inserted, when an affidavit is evaluated to 
determine probable cause. State v. Nielsen, 
727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986). Also the 
magistrate has discretion to define an 
ambiguous term. State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 
987, 992 (Utah 1989). The court's duty is 
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding probable 
cause existed. Illinois \v. Gates, 103 S. 
Ct.] at 2332. If the house discription [sic] 
had been included in the affidavit all the 
-6-
facts and circumstances provided show there 
was a fair probability contraband would be in 
the house described. State v. Hansen, 732 
P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) . 
Ruling at 2-3 (R. 39-40) (a copy of the trial court's ruling, in 
its entirety, is attached to this brief as Appendix C). Although 
the trial court's reading of State v. Nielsen is suspect, its 
ultimate conclusion that the magistrate had a substantial basis 
for determining that probable cause existed was correct. 
In State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court summarized the standards upon which a challenge to 
a search warrant is reviewed: 
The first question is whether the search 
warrant was supported by probable cause. The 
fourth amendment requires that when a search 
warrant is issued on the basis of an 
affidavit, that affidavit must contain 
specific facts sufficient to support a 
determination by a neutral and detached 
magistrate that probable cause exists. State 
v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), 
cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1565, 
94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987). The affiant must 
articulate particularized facts and 
circumstances leading to a conclusion that 
probable cause exists. Mere conclusory 
statements will not suffice. Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983). The 
magistrate's task is to make a "practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him [or her] . . . there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place." 
Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332; see State v. 
Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986). 
When a search warrant is challenged as 
having been issued without an adequate 
showing of probable cause, the fourth 
amendment does not require that the reviewing 
court conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination; 
instead, it requires only that the reviewing 
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court conclude "that the magistrate had ci 
substantial basis for . . . [determining] 
that probable cause existed." Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.. 
257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 
(I960)); see State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 
719 (Utah 1983); see generally 1 LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.1(c) (2d ed. 1987) . . 
. . The reviewing court, in conducting that 
examination, should consider a search warrant 
affidavit "in its entirety and in a common-
sense fashion." State v« Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); see also State v. 
Hansen, 732 P. 2d 127, 129-30 (Utah 1987) ("per 
curiam)(applying this standard of review). 
Finally, the reviewing court should pay 
"great deference" to the magistrate's 
decision. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 
at 2331 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 
393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590, 21 
L.Ed.2d 637 (1969)) . 
770 P.2d at 990-91. See also State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 
56-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 
(Utah 1990); State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). The trial court correctly applied these standards in 
concluding that the magistrate had a substantial basis for 
determining that probable cause existed to support the issuance 
of a search warrant for defendant's residence. 
Defendant correctly observes that paragraphs 16 through 
18 of the affidavit prepared and sworn to by Officer Nielsen are 
the only paragraphs that specifically refer to defendant's 
residence. They read, in context: 
15. At about 1:05 p.m. a maroon colored mini 
pick-up truck met with Taylor in front of 
Five Star Auto. Taylor left approximately 
five minutes later northbound on 1200 West. 
16. Taylor via a long a [sic] circuitous 
route arrived at 130 East 350 North in Orem. 
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17. At 130 East 350 North, Orem, Utah, 
resides Bryant Collard. Collard has 
convictions for DUI and theft. 
18. At 1:30 p.m. on April 29, 1989, I 
watched as Rex Taylor handed to an unknown 
white male in his 20fs wearing a bright green 
shirt, a bag approximately the size of a 
plastic grocery bag. The unknown white male 
then turned and walked into one of the 
houses. 
19. Taylor then left and drove to his 
mother's home located at 3460 North 475 East. 
Affidavit at 2 (Appendix B). In assessing the information 
contained in paragraphs 16-18, the trial court noted that the 
search warrant described defendant's residence in detail and the 
affidavit did not. Ruling at 3. It concluded, however, that 
"[t]he discrepency [sic] between the supporting affidavit and the 
search warrant indicates that the house discription [sic] 
probably was mistakenly omited [sic] from the affidavit." Ibid. 
Relying on State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987), for the proposition that "[o]mitted 
information must be inserted, when an affidavit is evaluated to 
determine probable cause," and on State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d at 
992, for the proposition that "the magistrate has discretion to 
define an ambiguous term," Ruling at 3, the court then concluded: 
If the house discription [sic] had been 
included in the affidavit all the facts and 
circumstances provided show there was a fair 
probability contraband would be in the house 
described. 
Ruling at 3 (citations omitted). 
As previously noted, defendant's primary challenge to 
the affidavit is that it failed to particularly describe the 
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house which the "unknown white male" entered after he received 
the bag from Taylor. Indeed, paragraph 18 states merely that the 
unknown white male "turned and walked into one of the houses" 
(emphasis added). The trial court sought to remedy this 
deficiency by inserting a more detailed description of the house 
into which the suspect walked by reference to the description of 
defendant's home that appears in the search warrant. However, 
this procedure is flawed in two respects. 
First, the trial court misinterpreted State v. Nielsen 
as allowing insertion into the affidavit of omitted information 
to render the affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause. 
In Nielsen, the supreme court, in the context of deciding whether 
there had been an invalid search under Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154 (1978), stated: 
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity 
of a search warrant if the defendant can 
establish that (i) an affiant in an affidavit 
supporting a search warrant made a false 
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii) 
the affidavit is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause after the 
misstatement is set aside. By an extension 
of reasoning, the same test applies when a 
misstatement occurs because information is 
omitted; the affidavit must be evaluated to 
determine if it will support a finding of 
probable cause when the omitted information 
is inserted. 
727 P.2d at 191 (citations omitted). Clearly, the supreme 
court's allowance for insertion of infoirmation into an affidavit 
was specifically tied to a false statement in the affidavit, 
something that was not present in the instant case. Therefore, 
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the trial court's reliance on Nielsen was misplaced, and its 
insertion of information to bolster the affidavit with additional 
3 information was improper. 
Second, a lucre ck-tailed description of defendant's 
house, without any iiii.'ormciti^ n that the unidentified white male 
entered that house, does little to cure the ambiguity inherent in 
paragraph 18's statement that the suspect entered "one of the 
houses•" 
On the other hand, the trial court's reliance on State 
v. Babbell for the proposition that the magistrate had the 
discretion to define an ambiguous term in the affidavit (i.e., 
paragraph 18's reference to "one of the houses") was entirely 
justified. In Babbell, where the sufficiency of the affidavit 
supporting a search warrant was challenged, the affidavit "set 
out specifically and in detail the characteristics of the 
[defendant's] truck as described by the witnesses [who observed 
the defendant shortly before he sexually assaulted one of their 
friends]." 770 P.2d at 992. "It then explain[ed] that Cazier 
[the affiant], a trained officer, had observed the truck from the 
street and then more closely with the resident's permission and 
There was no evidence before the trial court that the 
magistrate had information, beyond that which appeared in the 
affidavit, on what house the unidentified white male entered 
after receiving the suspected contraband from Taylor. Officer 
Nielsen, who swore to the affidavit, did not testify as to what 
additional information, if any, he gave the magistrate prior to 
the issuance of the warrant (SH. 14-22). And, Officer Teuscher, 
who assisted in the preparation of both the affidavit sworn to by 
Officer Nielsen and the search warrant signed by the magistrate, 
acknowledged that he was neither present when Nielsen presented 
those documents to the magistrate nor aware of any additional 
information that Nielsen may have provided the magistrate at that 
time (SH. 44-45, 53-54). 
-11-
state[d] that defendant's vehicle "matches' the given 
description." Ibid. On these facts the supreme court concluded: 
We acknowledge that the affidavit is 
ambiguous in its use of the word "match/' but 
conclude that it was within the magistrate's 
discretion to construe Cazier's statement 
that Babbell's truck "matched the 
description" to mean that the truck matched 
with respect to those chartacteristics 
expressly described in the affidavit. Once 
that reasonable construction was made, the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis" for 
determining that there was a "fair 
probability" that a search would uncover 
evidence. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 
S.Ct. at 2332. The described characteristics 
of the truck are sufficiently specific to 
permit the magistrate to decide whether the 
truck in the driveway was distinctive enough 
to give him probable cause to believe that it 
was the truck used in the crime and that a 
search would produce evidence. 
4 
770 P.2d at 992 (footnote omitted). Whether the affidavit in 
the instant case was sufficient to establish probable cause to 
search defendant's house is, as was a similar issue in Babbell, a 
In the footnote omitted from this quote the court said: 
Although we conclude that the magistrate 
did not err in finding the affidavit 
sufficient, we must observe that this is a 
very close question. If the affidavit were 
more vague, we might well reach the opposite 
conclusion. Judges should be reluctant to 
base a probable cause determination on so 
poorly drafted an affidavit. The better 
approach would be to require that an affiant 
take the simple step of clearly and 
unambiguously stating how the vehicle matches 
the detailed description obtained from 
witnesses. A few short minutes spent in more 
carefully preparing this affidavit would have 
ensured the protection of the accused's 
constitutional rights while saving a 
substantial amount of time for the courts and 
the parties. 
770 P.2d at 992 n.3. 
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very close question. However, the magistrate, reading paragraphs 
15 through 19 of the affidavit together, could have reasonably 
construed paragraph 18 to mean that the unidentified white male, 
after receiving the bag from Taylor, had entered the house at the 
precise address where the suspected drug delivery had just 
occurred, which was specifically identified in paragraphs 16 and 
17 as 130 East 350 North, Orem, Utah, defendant's residence. 
While the affidavit surely could have been more 
artfully drafted, see Babbell, 770 P.2d at 992 n.3, a reviewing 
court must consider an affidavit "in its entirety and in a 
common-sense fashion," Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985)), and recognize that 
"affidavits 'are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and 
haste of a criminal investigation [and that] [tjechnical 
requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common 
law pleadings have no proper place in this area.'" Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 233, 235 (1983) (quoting United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). As also stated in Gates: 
[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-
fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of 
the affidavit should not take the form of de 
novo review. A magistrate's "determination 
of probable cause should be paid great 
deference by reviewing courts." Spinelli, 
supra, at 419. "A grudging or negative 
attitude by reviewing courts toward 
warrants," Ventresca, 380 U.S., at 108, is 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's 
strong preference for searches conducted 
pursuant to a warrant; "courts should not 
invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting 
affidavits] in a hyper technical, rather than 
commonsense manner." Ld., at 109. 
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We also have said that "[a]lthough in a 
particular case it may not be easy to 
determine when an affidavit demonstrates the 
existence of probable cause, the resolution 
of doubtful or marginal cases in this area 
should be largely determined by the 
preference to be accorded to warrants," 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 
(1985). This reflects both a desire to 
encourage use of the warrant process by 
police officers and a recognition that once a 
warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is less severe than otherwise may be the 
case. 
462 U.S. at 236, 237 n.10. 
In sum, although admittedly a very close question, the 
trial court, according the magistrate the high degree of 
deference required by United States Supreme Court case law, 
properly concluded that the magistrate had a substantial basis 
for determining that there was probable cause to search 
defendant's house. Even though this is a marginal case, it 
"'should be . . . determined by the preference to be accorded to 
warrants.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 n.10 (quoting United States 
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)). Cf. State v. Droneburg, 
781 P.2d at 1305 (where the supporting affidavit, which contained 
nothing more than conclusory statements of the affiant officer, 
was so obviously insufficient that the State conceded there was 
not a substantial basis upon which the magistrate could determine 
the existence of probable cause). 
B. Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the affidavit 
was inadequate to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis 
for determining that probable cause existed, the evidence seized 
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pursuant to the invalid warrant would nevertheless be admissible 
under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States 
Supreme Court held that federal constitutional guarantees against 
unlawful search and seizure required exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence in state criminal trials. However, in Leon the 
Court carved out a "good faith" exception to that exclusionary 
rule, "hold[ing] that evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached 
magistrate need not be excluded, as a matter of federal law, from 
the case in chief of federal and state criminal prosecutions." 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court 
said: 
We conclude that the marginal or 
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing 
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search 
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs 
of exclusion. We do not suggest, however, 
that exclusion is always inappropriate in 
cases where an officer has obtained a warrant 
and abided by its terms. H[S]earches 
pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any 
deep inquiry into reasonableness," Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S., at 267 (WHITE, J., 
concurring in judgment), for "a warrant 
issued by a magistrate normally suffices to 
establish" that a law enforcement officer has 
"acted in good faith in conducting the 
search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 823, n.32 (1982). Nevertheless, the 
officer's reliance on the magistrate's 
probable-cause determination and on the 
technical sufficiency of the warrant he 
issues must be objectively reasonable, cf. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 
(1982), and it is clear that in some 
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circumstances the officer will have no 
reasonable grounds for believing that the 
warrant was properly issued. 
Suppression therefore remains an 
appropriate remedy if the* magistrate or judge 
in issuing a warrant was misled by 
information in an affidavit that the affiant 
knew was false or would have known was false 
except for his reckless disregard of the 
truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 
(1978). The exception we recognize today 
will also not apply in cases where the 
issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his 
judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-
Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 
(1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably 
well trained officer should rely on the 
warrant. Nor would an officer manifest 
objective good faith in relying on a warrant 
based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia 
of probables cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S., 
at 610-611 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); 
see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 263-264 
(WHITE, J.f concurring in judgment). 
Finally, depending on the circumstances of 
the particular case, a warrant may be so 
facially deficient—i.e., in failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the 
things to be seized—that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be 
valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, 
at 988-991. 
468 U.S. at 922-23 (footnotes omitted). 
The Leon good faith exception applies directly to this 
case. If the Officer Nielsen's supporting affidavit was 
technically insufficient because it failed to indicate more 
precisely that the unidentified white male entered defendant's 
house, it was not so inadequate that the officers could not have 
acted in objectively reasonable r€»liance on the warrant that was 
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. This is not a case 
where the issuing magistrate was misled by knowingly or 
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recklessly false information in an affidavit, or where the 
magistrate wholly abandoned his role as a neutral and detached 
judicial officer, or where the affidavit was "so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. Cf. 
State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1305 (where the supporting 
affidavit was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that the 
State conceded "it was unreasonable for the officer who prepared 
the affidavit to rely on a warrant issued on the strength of 
it"). Quite to the contrary, this is a case where the officers 
prepared a very detailed affidavit which, in hindsight, could and 
should have more precisely identified defendant's house as the 
house into which a suspected recipient of contraband had entered. 
However, that defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that the 
officers had "no reasonable grounds for believing that the 
warrant was properly issued." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. In short, 
the officers' reliance on the warrant issued was objectively 
reasonable, and the deterrent purpose of the federal exclusionary 
rule would not be served by excluding the challenged evidence 
under the circumstances of this case. 
Although in the trial court the State did not argue the Leon 
good faith exception as an alternative ground for admission of 
the challenged evidence, it is settled law that an appellate 
court may affirm on any proper ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 
257, 260 (Utah 1985) ("[T]his Court may affirm the trial court's 
decision on any proper grounds, even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling."). 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS ERRONEOUSLY CONVICTED OF BOTH 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND 
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITHOUT AFFIXING A 
STATE TAX STAMP TO IT, AS THOSE OFFENSES ARE 
INCLUDED OFFENSES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-
1-402(3) (1990). 
Defendant argues that possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1990), and possession of marijuana without affixing a 
state tax stamp to it, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-
106(2) (Supp. 1990), are included offenses under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(3) (1990), and thus he could not properly be convicted 
and sentenced for both offenses. The State agrees. 
Section 76-1-402(3) provides in pertinent part: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged[.] 
The analysis for determining whether offenses are included under 
section 76-1-402(3)(a) is set forth in State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 
(Utah 1983). As stated in State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1191 
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988), the Hill test 
has two components: 
The principal test [for whether offenses are 
included] involves a comparison of the 
statutory elements of each crime. Subsection 
76-1-402(3)(a) provides the definition of 
lesser included offenses that is applied for 
this purpose: an offense is lesser included 
when M[i]t is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to 
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establish the commission of the offense 
charged. . . . " Thus, where the two crimes 
are "such that the greater cannot be 
committed without necessarily having 
committed the lesser," then as a matter of 
law they stand in the relationship of greater 
and lesser offenses, and the defenant cannot 
be convicted or punished for both. 
. . . . 
The secondary test is required by the 
circumstance that some crimes have multiple 
variations, so that a greater-lesser 
relationship exists between some variations 
of these crimes, but not between others. A 
theoretical comparison of the statutory 
elements of two crimes having multiple 
variations will be insufficient. In order to 
determine whether a defendant can be 
convicted and punished for two different 
crimes committed in connection with a single 
criminal episode, the court must consider the 
evidence to determine whether the greater-
lesser relationship exists between the 
specific variations of the crimes actually 
proved at trial. 
743 P.2d at 1191 (quoting State v. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97) 
(citations omitted). 
Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) provides that it is unlawful: 
for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless 
it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while 
acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this 
subsection[.] 
Section 59-19-106(2) states: 
In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a 
dealer distributing or possessing marihuana 
or controlled substances without affixing the 
appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
The variation of section 59-19-106(2) proved at trial was 
possession of marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it. 
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Proof of this variation necessarily established the offense of 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) defined in 
section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)• Therefore, the two offenses are 
included offenses under the Hill test, and defendant could not 
properly be convicted and punished for both. 
Accordingly, the Court should vacate defendant's 
conviction and sentence for possession of marijuana without 
affixing a state tax stamp to it, leaving intact the conviction 
7 
and sentence for possession of a controlled substance. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a 
controlled substance and vacate his conviction and sentence for 
possession of marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it. 
Had defendant been charged with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iv) (1990), there would be no included offense problem. 
This is so because each offense would have required proof of an 
element the other did not—i.e., section 59-19-106(2) requires 
proof of the absence of a state tax stamp in addition to 
possession, and section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) requires proof of 
intent to distribute in addition to possession. See State v. 
Cross, 649 P.2d 72, 73 (Utah 1982). 
7 
Both of defendant's convictions were for third degree felonies. 
He does not indicate in his brief which conviction he wants the 
Court to set aside. Because the code provides for enhanced 
punishment for a subsequent conviction of marijuana possession, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(d) (1990), the State requests 
that defendant's conviction of possession under section 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) be the conviction affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /ff^ay of September, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDICIES 
APPENDIX A 
C&J>>^ ^ f ^ 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AND APPLICATION FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Tom Nielsen, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and 
say: 
1. That your affiant is a police officer for the City of 
Provo, currently assigned to the Special Investigative Services 
Bureau in the Narcotics Division. 
2* That officers of the Provo Police Department, acting upon 
information received from several confidential informants and 
verified by surveillance intercepted and followed a truck 
belonging to Rex Taylor. 
3. The information received was that subject Taylor would be 
transporting and delivering controlled substances, marijuana. 
(See affidavit in support of and application for search warrant 
executed by Officer Kim Collins on April 29, 1989 before the 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis of the Fourth Circuit Court, a copy of 
which is attached hereto and included herein as if set forth in 
full.) 
4. Acting on the information your affiant went to S.D.S. Auto 
at 825 West Center, Provo, Utah, looking for Taylor's truck which 
is described as a black 1969 General Motors pick-up truck with a 
black camper shell pulling a boat trailer. 
5. At 12:15 p.m. on April 29, 1989, I found the truck and Rex 
Taylor on the lot at S.D.S. Auto. With Taylor was Bruce Draper, 
identified in the affidavit attached hereto, and his vehicle, 
which is a 1984 Chevrolet Blazer, model K10, Utah plate 524BSA, 
and a vehicle that I recognized belonging to Scott Fazzio, known 
to be a co-owner of S.D.S. Auto. 
6. Rex Taylor's vehicle was parked on the east end of the lot 
and was joined at the same spot by the above two vehicles and 
occupants. They met and had conversation for approximately five 
minutes, during which time an unknown white male left with a 
brown paper bag about the size approximately six inches wide and 
two inches thick and twelve inches long. Then all three vehicles 
left S.D.S. Auto. 
7. Fazzio's car left eastbound on Center Street. Rex Taylor 
and Bruce Draper drove westbound on Center Street in their 
separate vehicles arriving at a small grocery store in the 1900 
block of West Center. 
8. Taylor and Draper parked their vehicles in a grocery store 
lot next to each other. They both left their vehicles and moved 
about their vehicles for approximately five minutes. 
9. Taylor and Draper then left the grocery store lot driving 
north on Geneva Road. Bruce Draper drove to his home at 1964 
West 500 North. Taylor continued north on Geneva Road into Orem. 
10. At approximately 12:45 p.m. on April 29, 1989, Taylor 
arrived at a Protestant Church located approximately 300 South 
1200 West, Orem, Utah. 
11. There Taylor met an unknown white male driving a yellow Ford 
pick-up truck who appeared to be waiting for Taylor. Taylor and 
the unknown male conversed for about five minutes before driving 
south on 1200 West in Orem. 
12. Taylor and the unknown male in separate vehicles arrived at 
Five Star Auto located at 600 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah, and 
conversed for another five to ten minutes, while moving about 
their vehicles on foot. 
13. At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29, 1989, the yellow 
pick-up truck left Five Star Auto northbound on 1200 West. 
14. At the same time Taylor was conversing with the male in the 
yellow pick-up at least two unknown white males exited Five Star 
Auto and met with Taylor and the male. 
15. At about 1:05 p.m. a maroon colored mini pick-up truck met 
with Taylor in front of Five Star Auto. Taylor left 
approximately five minutes later northbound on 1200 West. 
16. Taylor via a long a circuitous route arrived at 130 East 3 50 
North in Orem. 
17. At 130 East 350 North, Orem, Utah, resides Bryant Collard. 
Collard has convictions for DUI and theft. 
18. At 1:30 p.m. on April 29, 1989, I watched as Rex Taylor 
handed to an unknown white male in his 20' s wearing a bright 
green shirt, a bag approximately the size of a plastic grocery 
bag. The unknown white male then turned and walked into one of 
the houses. 
19. Taylor then left and drove to his mother fs home located at 
3460 North 475 East. There Taylor made several trips between 
his truck and his mother's house. 
20. At approximately 2:00 p.m. an unknown white male arrived and 
spoke with Rex near the rear door of the camper shell. At one 
point Rex opened the camper shell door allowing the unknown male 
to look in. 
21. Shortly thereafter your affiant along with other officers 
from the Provo Police Department and Utah County Sheriff's Office 
arrived and took Rex Taylor and the other unknown individual into 
custody. In plain view in the cab of the pick-up truck was a 
brown bag similar to the one delivered to the male at S.D.S. Auto 
and a large quantity of twenty dollar bills. In plain view 
through the window in the door of the camper shell was a brown 
plastic trash bag containing clear plastic zip-lock bags 
containing a green leafy substance. 
22. The truck was impounded and inventoried and approximately 12 
to 13 pounds of marijuana was located in the back. The brown bag 
in the cab also contained marijuana. Also found in the truck was 
in excess of $25,000 cash. 
23. Rex Taylor owns a home located at 4574 North Windsor Drive, 
Provo, Utah, a short distance from the location where Rex Taylor 
was arrested on April 29, 1989, as described above. The 
residence is further described as a larger home with brown brick 
in the center, the north and south sides framed in cream uith 
brown wood. There is a deck facing the front, from the south 
side to the north side. The residence is on the east side ct 
Windsor Drive. It has steps leading to the front door. The here 
is on a steep incline. The home bears the number 4574 on the 
south portion and the front portion by the curb. On the nortn 
side of the building above the garage is a large room. 
* **- lfe«\* —. , _ 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AND APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH > 
se 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Kim Collins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and 
say: 
1. That your affiant is a police officer for the City of Provo, 
currently assigned to the Special Investigative Services Bureau 
in the Narcotics Division. 
la. Your affiant has knowledge in the use and sale of narcotics, 
i.e. marijuana, cocaine, crystal methamphetamine. Your affiant 
has received training from the Provo City Police Department, Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, and the Department zi 
Justice, State of California. In November of 1988 your affiant 
attended a forty-hour class on the identification and detection 
of the aforementioned drugs. Your affiant also has knowledge 
that individuals involved in the illegal use and sale 01 
narcotics frequently deal in large quantities of cash, and tr.at 
said cash is normally broken down into envelopes marked with tne 
amount to be delivered to each individual, and that marijuana 13 
normally packaged in zlplock container bags, as well as crystal 
methamphetamine and cocaine, and that scales and other measuring 
devices are normally present at defendant's residence. 
lb* I have developed contacts and have spoken with users, 
manufactuers and traffickers of controlled substances, along with 
informants and experts in the area of controlled substances 
regarding the manufacture and trafficking of controlled 
substances in the Utah County area. I have negotiated for and 
purchased controlled substances while acting in an undercover 
capacity. 
2. On April 29, 1989 at 0830 hours affiant received a telephone 
call from confidential informant informing me that a delivery of 
20 to SO pounds of marijuana is to be made at 1964 West SQO 
North, known as Leisure Village Trailer Park, Provo City, Utah. 
The defendant delivering the marijuana is a Rex P. Taylor, date 
of birth August 5, 1934, and the delivery is to be made to Jeff 
racovary and aaizing of ona pound of marijuana. Tha marijuana 
vif daacribad aa baing concaalad undarnaath a vaterbed, which 13 
tha eama placa your affiant racovarad tha illagal eubetance. 
A. On February 28, 1969 confidential informant provided 
information on the following individuals aa dealing 
in narcotice. 
a. Douglaa Snow, date of birth Auguat 14, 1956, has 
a criminal hiatory dating to 1976, including 
alcohol and drug arreata. Snow alao reaides at 
1964 West 500 North, Provo, Utah. Snow ia an 
aaaoclate of Bruce Draper, and also haa a 
telephone liated in hia name at aaid address, 
phone number 373-6744. 
b. Rex P. Taylor, date of birth August 9, 1954, has 
a criminal hiatory beginning in 1973 for alcohol 
and drug arreats with convictions of possession 
of controlled substance. Taylor ia believed to 
be living in Laa Vegaa, Nevada and makee frequent 
tripa to the Provo area every two weeke. 
c. Jack Wilkinson AKA Jackie Wilkinaon, date of 
birth January 6, 1966, has arrests for alcohol, 
narcotica, and burglary beginning from 1973 to 
preeent. 
d. Bruce Draper, date of birth January 20, 1955, has 
arreata for alcohol and drug involvement for the 
past ten yeara, including arreats for possession 
of controlled substancee. 
4* Confidential Informant has further provided the following 
information that Jack Wilkinaon receivea marijuana from Bruce 
Draper, who, in turn, purchaaea his marijuana from Rex P. Taylor. 
5. In January of 1989 officera from Provo City Police 
Department and Utah County Sheriff's Department conducted 
eurveillancee at the reaidence of Bruce Draper in which vehicles 
belonging to Rex Taylor, Douglas Snow, Jack Wilkinson were ail 
seen parked at the reaidence of Draper. 
6. Your affiant has received further information from an 
independent aource, a David J. Hecham, date of birth September 3, 
1963. Your affiant interviewed Hecham on March 23, 1989, wherein 
Hecham identified the following individuals dealing in narcotic 
7. Your affiant baiievea that a dalivary of marijuana and 
crystal mathamphatamina will ba dalivarad to aaid addraaa by Rex 
Taylor on thla data. 
8. Your affiant hat probabla cauaa to baliava that narcotic 
trafficking la currantiy baing conductad at 1964 Weat 500 North, 
Provo, Utah in a mobila homa locatad In Lalaura Village Trailer 
Park, and that larga amount* of cryatal methamphetamme, 
marijuana ara baing distributed from thla location. 
9* Baaed upon my training and experience I believe that a 
search of tha property at 1964 West 500 North, Provo City, Utan 
will result in the seizure of narcotics; i.a. cocaine, crystal 
mathamphatamina and marijuana, and your affiant further requests 
that based upon the aforementioned information and inveatigation, 
a search warrant be iasued for items in vJtrSTmT^on of aaction 56-
37-8. 
Subscribed and->aworn to before/me this day ^i 
/R C U I T J U D G E 
APPENDIX B 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
THE STATE OF UTAH to: Tom Nielsen, Provo Police Department, or 
any other peace officer in the State of Utah in assistance?: 
Proof of affidavit having been made before me this £9fh clay 
of April, 1989, by Tom Nielsen of Provo City, Utah County, State 
of Utah, that he has probable cause to believe that evidence 
involved in the use and sale of narcotics is currently located <-1 
130 East 350NNorth, Oreni, Utah. Residence is further described 
as being a red brick house with ati aluminum screen door &ii(i has * 
bright r&d asphalt shingle roof. There DS a pine tree near thc> 
center of the front lawn and a small white mail box attached to 
the front of the house next to the screen door with the numbers 
130 on it. A car port is on hte east side of the house, a blacl' 
wrought iron hand rail on the front steps and adjacent sidt^wcUk 
leading to the front steps. There is a dark stone planter box on 
the east side of the driveway. 
Your affiant also requests permission to search all rooms, 
attics, safes, garage, out-buildings, whether attached or 
unattached, surrounding grounds, storage areas, trac,h 
receptacles, vehicle<s) and any and all other containers, 
including but not limited to as follows: 
1. Evidence of conspiracy including books, ledgers, 
accounts payable and receivable, Buy-owe sheets, 
contracts, letters, memoranda of agreement between 
conspirators, formulas, receipts, telephone records, 
phone books, address books, and other personal 
property tending to establish a conspiracy. 
2. U.S. Currency 
3. Financial records of persons in control of the 
premises, tax returns, bank accounts, loan 
application, income and expense records, safe deposit 
box keys, and records, property, acquisitions, And 
notes. 
control of said premises and/or vehicles), including 
rent receipts, telephone bills, 'utility bills, 
telephone/address books, cancelled mail, vehicle 
registration, keys and photographs. 
5. Rifles, handguns, shotguns, along with any ammunition 
for same. 
6, Methamphetamine, amphetamine, and ingredients used in 
the production of methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine 
both rock and powder, and any other illegal narcotj.cs>. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Scales 
Record of drug transactions. 
Upon reading said information supported by said affidavit, 
the court is of the opinion and, therefore, finds there is 
probable cause to believe that the facts stated in said affidavit 
are true, and that evidence pertaining to the above-men LIOIIPCJ 
case may be contained in the described location. 
The items to 
Sections 58-37-8. 
be seized are evidence of violations of 
This is a no-knock search warrant to prevent the delay or 
discovery or destruction of narcotics at said location. 
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU are hereby commanded to 
make a thorough search of the above-described residence and 
vehicle and hereto seize all evidence pertaining to the? 
investigation as described by said affidavit, a,)id to make returns 
promptly to this court of your doings under this writ. 
You are further directed to bring.said evidence forthwith at 
the above Fourth circuit Court, Provo Utah, County of Utah, or to 
hold same in your possession pending further notice of tins 
court. 
Dated this £9th day of April, 1989 
Time J^g^^/P? • 
THIS WARRANT MAY BE EXECUTED ANY TIME DURING THE DAY OR NIGHT. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN DAYS OF ITS ISSUANCE. 
APPENDIX C 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
****** 
THE STATE OF UTAH, CASE NUMBER CR 89 364 
Plaintiff, 
VS. RULING 
BRYANT COLLARD, 
Defendant. BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
****** 
This matter came regularly before the court on the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Deputy Utah County Attorney 
James R. Taylor represented the State of Utah, and Shelden 
Carter Esq. represented the defendant. The court having read 
the Motion makes the following Findings and Ruling. 
FINDINGS 
1. The police came to Mr. Collard's home about 10:00 
p.m. with a search warrant to search for drugs and 
contraband. The police were expecting to find marijuana. To 
avoid disrupting his family Mr. Collard assisted the police 
in finding a pound of marijuana in the basement. Defendant 
now claims that the search warrant was not valid, because the 
supporting affidavit did not show sufficient probable cause, 
and any consent for the search was coerced. 
2. A search warrant must be supported by an affidavit 
providing a nutral magistrate with substantial basis for 
determining probable cause, which is based on a 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Illinois v. Gates. 
462 U.S. 237, 238-9, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983) The 
defendant contends that the search warrant was not valid 
because the affidavit supporting the warrant does not show 
sufficient probable cause. Specifically the defendant says 
the affidavit does not adequately describe the house and the 
suspect involved. 
3. The affidavit gives detailed information about a man 
named Rex Taylor who was suspected of delivering marijuana 
for further distribution. An informant provided the police 
with a tip about Taylor. This tip was verified by police 
observation. The affidavit describes a circuitous route with 
frequent stops and brief interactions with several 
individuals. At the end of this route the police arrested 
Taylor who had in his truck large quantities of marijuana and 
cash. All of these facts support a finding that Taylor was 
in the act of distributing marijuana. The defendant was one 
of the individuals who had a brief exchange with Taylor. The 
affidavit states Taylor arrived at 130 East 350 North, Orem, 
Utah; where Bryant Collard resides. It then describes how 
Taylor "handed to an unknown white male in his 20's wearing a 
bright green shirt, a bag approximately the size of a plastic 
grocery bag. The unknown white male then turned and walked 
into one of the houses." The affidavit does not describe the 
defendant or his home in any more detail. 
4. However, the search warrant does describe the house 
in detail including the house number on the mailbox attached 
to the house. Whether the search warrant description is 
adequate depends upon the facts of each case, and the 
description is adequate if the officer with reasonbale effort 
can identify the place. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
1102 (Utah 1985). The search warrant description in this 
case should be sufficient for determining which house is to 
be searched. 
5. The discrepency between the supporting affidavit and 
the search warrant indicates that the house description 
probably was mistakenly omited from the affidavit. Omitted 
information must be inserted, when an affidavit is evaluated 
to determine probable cause. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 
191 (Utah 1986). Also the magistrate has discretion to 
define an ambigious term. State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 
992 (Utah 1989). The court's duty is simply to ensure that 
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 
probable cause existed. Illinois at 2332. If the house 
discription had been included in the affidavit all the facts 
and circumstances provided show there was a fair probability 
contraband would be in the house described. State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987). 
6. Because great deference is given to the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause, and sufficient facts were 
present in this case to support the magistrate's finding of 
probable cause, the search warrant issued is valid. Any 
further issue of whether there was consent to search does not 
need to be addressed. 
RULING 
Defendant's Motion to Supress is denied. 
Dated this 11th day of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
//C^^Y 
B0Y6 L. PARK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor 
Sheldon R. Carter, Esq. 
